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This article analyses the 2007 – 08 postelection violence in Kenya arguing that 
there were significant socio-spatial variations to the conflict in urban areas 
that can be better understood through an analysis of localised framing 
processes. It argues that, in some urban neighbourhoods, an underlying frame 
of autochthony is (re)produced through lived experience, facilitating the 
casting of ethnic others as either good or bad guests in times of political 
transition. The flawed elections of 2007 justified the violent eviction of ‘bad’ 
guests in these settings. This frame of autochthony, however, is absent in other 
urban neighbourhoods, and so these spaces remained relatively calm for the 
duration of the crisis. The article further argues that the flexibility of the good 
guest/bad guest frame enabled its reconfiguration at the local level, leading to 
variations in the fault lines of conflict across both time and space. It concludes 
that frame analysis can help to elucidate these micro-geographies of conflict. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
On 30 December 2007, Kenyans went to the polls for the fourth time since the 
reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1992. After a heated campaign period, an 
election day riddled with irregularities, a visible bungling of the counting process 
and an unexpected victory for the incumbent president, Mwai Kibaki, violence 
erupted across the country. The conflict raged until a power-sharing agreement was 
reached at the end of February 2008, leaving approximately 1,300 people dead and 
over 650,000 displaced.1 Kenya’s legacy of violent ethnic politics has attracted 
significant scholarly attention over the years, and there are a number of valuable 
explanations of the phenomenon. Most of these analyses follow conventional lines 
of enquiry in ethnic conflict research, focusing upon elite behaviour, mass 
mobilisation and the structural factors that make conflict more explicable; that is to 
say, they fall predominantly into the ‘why publics follow’ and the ‘dogs that bark’ 
camps.’2 Whilst offering important insights into the causes of ethnic violence in 
Kenya, many of these analyses struggle to account for local nuances in conflict 
dynamics and fall short of a locally sensitive understanding of the violence, 
particularly in the urban arena. In fact, the 2007 – 08 postelection violence was 
  
marked by significant urban socio-spatial variations that cannot be accounted for by 
existing explanations alone. Whilst ethnicised urban spaces – that is neighbour- 
hoods and villages dominated by one ethnic group – experienced a sudden descent 
into intense and acute violence following the announcement of the presidential 
results, more ethnically mixed areas – non-ethnicised spaces – tended to remain 
relatively calm for the duration of the crisis. In addition, whilst the violence reflected 
the politico-ethnic fault lines of the elections in some neighbourhoods, in others, 
ethnic animosities were reshaped by the local context. This paper explores these 
urban micro-geographies of the Kenyan crisis, demonstrating that localised framing 
processes helped shape the micro-level dynamics of conflict. It suggests that 
narratives of autochthony have emerged in the urban context in Kenya. Autochthony 
literally means ‘sons of the soil’ and refers to myths of origin and claims of ‘native’ 
status. These discourses are also being (re)produced in everyday life in ethnicised 
urban spaces, and facilitated the framing of ethnic minorities as either ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ guests in the 2007 elections. On the other hand, this frame had little resonance 
in non-ethnicised spaces where autochthonous discourses are less compatible with 
lived experience. Moreover, the inherent flexibility of the good guest/bad guest 
frame enabled localised variations in the fault lines of conflict. The paper draws 
upon an argument articulated in an earlier paper of mine – that the postelection 
violence can be understood, in part, as a performance of territorialised identity 
narratives.3 However, it moves beyond this analysis by demonstrating not only the 
variability of these discourses in urban spaces and the socio-spatial dynamics of 
urban violence, but also by highlighting how the narrative can be used by local-level 
actors to reframe who constitutes ‘the enemy.’ 
The paper begins by providing a brief summary of the key events leading up to 
the Kenyan postelection violence before reviewing some of the more prominent 
analyses of ethnic conflict in the country. The third section moves on to identify the 
roots of the good guest/bad guest frame and highlights its differential applicability 
across urban space. The concluding section analyses the micro-geographies of the 
Kenyan postelection violence, explaining the socio-spatial patterns through an 
analysis of localised framing processes. Thus, in the Kenyan case, frame analysis 
enhances our understanding of why violence occurs in some places and not in others, 
and it helps to explain how the fault lines of conflict can shift over time and space. 
 
THE 2007 KENYAN ELECTIONS 
In the context of Kenya’s legacy of violent electoral politics, the relatively peaceful 
transfer of power in 2002 from the long-standing KANU regime to the newly formed 
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), for many, ‘heralded expectations that a new 
political era of democracy had dawned in Kenya.’4 However, these expectations were 
soon met with disillusionment and disappointment as the new administration – led by 
the Kikuyu president, Mwai Kibaki – failed to deliver on many of its campaign 
promises. High profile corruption scandals, the failure to honour a memorandum  
of understanding to distribute power evenly amongst NARC factions and the 
  
‘Kikuyuisation’ of ‘plum’ jobs indicated to many that the administration had reverted 
back to the corrupt and tribal style of the past. However, it was the contentious draft 
constitution and the subsequent referendum that marked the apex of political 
fragmentation and sowed the seeds of the ethnic polarisation of 2007. 
One of the key campaign platforms of the NARC alliance in 2002 was the 
ambitious promise of enacting a new constitution within 100 days of assuming power. 
By 2005, however, when the country finally went to a referendum, the proposed new 
constitution of Kenya was a significantly watered-down version of the earlier draft 
and was widely regarded as a betrayal of Kenyan democracy, as a document that 
served the  exclusive  interests  of  Kikuyu  hardliners  within  the  government.5  
An alliance of leading politicians from the Kalenjin, Luo, Luhya, Kamba and 
Coastal communities – led by Raila Odinga – emerged to contest the proposed 
constitution and under the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) banner, they 
campaigned against the government. ODM were victorious and the constitution was 
defeated by a significant margin. However, widespread perceptions that the Kikuyu 
community alone had remained loyal to Kibaki in the referendum reinforced notions 
of their isolation from other Kenyans.6 The rhetoric of ‘all-against-the-Kikuyu’ 
emerged and intensified in the lead-up to 2007 as ODM was registered as an official 
party. Thus, the 2007 elections were to pit Luo, Raila Odinga and his multi-ethnic 
ODM alliance against Mwai Kibaki’s predominantly Kikuyu Party of National Unity 
(PNU). Anti-Kikuyu sentiment was high by 2007; the campaign period was marked 
by hate speech on the part of both political elites and ordinary Kenyans, and it was 
punctuated by incidents of small-scale violence and intimidation. 
Given the multi-ethnic nature of ODM, and the fact that the party was seen as an 
alliance of 41 tribes setting themselves against one, many Kenyans firmly believed 
that the party could not be defeated if the elections were free and fair. Whilst it was 
widely perceived that Central Province – the ancestral homeland of the Kikuyu 
community – would remain loyal to ‘their man’ Kibaki, ODM was believed to 
enjoy considerable support in almost all other provinces. According to this ethnic 
arithmetic, then, Raila Odinga and his ODM party were expected to win the 
presidential election. So when Kibaki was unexpectedly announced as President, 
ODM supporters were convinced that the election had been rigged. Taking to the 
streets in protest, members of ODM-affiliated communities attacked their Kikuyu 
neighbours almost immediately after the announcement, and as the violence 
continued some Kikuyu began to launch their own retaliatory attacks. The country 
descended into spirals of hatred and revenge, coming to an end only when a power- 
sharing agreement was brokered between the two principals under the mediation of 
Kofi Annan on 28 February 2008. 
 
EXISTING EXPLANATIONS OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN KENYA 
Existing explanations of ethnic violence in Kenya have highlighted the centrality  
of four key factors, namely: the zero-sum nature of neo-patrimonial politics and     
a context of deliberately weak institutions; elite orchestration and a culture of 
  
impunity; the diffusion and normalisation of violence; and deep-rooted historical 
grievances, particularly in relation to land. This section offers a brief overview of 
these key arguments. 
The neo-patrimonial and ethnicised structure of Kenyan politics has turned 
political competition into a high stakes, winner-takes-all ethnic game in which both 
elites and local level actors alike are willing to resort to any means to secure victory 
in the polls. The allocative and coercive capacity of the presidential seat,7 in addition 
to the vast opportunities for personal  enrichment  attached  to  it,  has  ensured  
that leaders are ‘dying to win’ and are more than willing to use violence to do so.8 
Furthermore, historically, members of the President’s community have been widely 
perceived to benefit disproportionately in the allocation of goods and resources at 
the expense of other groups. Consequently, for ordinary citizens, capturing the state 
and putting ‘our man’ in the presidential seat is regarded as the ‘only way to eat’9 and 
fears of marginalisation and exclusion under the rule of another community are 
pervasive. 10 This high stakes, zero-sum ethnic game is central to understanding  
‘the lengths to which leaders and followers are willing to go to get their leader   
into power.’11 Moreover, the context of deliberately weak institutions that are 
controlled and manipulated by the state – where electoral oversight bodies are 
deeply distrusted, and dispute mechanisms are regarded as biased and partial – 
‘pushed the resolution of Kenya’s elections off the table and into the streets.’12 
A second pervasive argument in the literature is that elites ‘play the ethnic card’; 
they manipulate latent ethnic tensions, ‘pitting one community against the other’,13 
and they organise, fund and direct violent ethnic militias in pursuit of their political 
agendas. Several scholars have identified elite fragmentation as a key motivator in 
this ‘instrumentalisation of disorder.’14 As political and economic resources 
dwindled in the 1980s, the system of patronage networks that had sustained a fragile 
elite alliance began to shrink, breaking up the predominant unity of political 
leadership. Whilst the elite pact had previously mitigated against the mobilisation of 
ethnic tensions,15 amidst calls for political liberalisation alternative opportunities for 
power and inclusion opened up and politicians began to mobilise their ethnic 
constituents in sinister ways to better their political position. Furthermore, the failure 
to prosecute this deliberate use of violence by elites in the past has embedded a clear 
culture of impunity in Kenya and ensured that, in 2007, there was little disincentive 
for politicians to stoke tensions and foster violence in order to disrupt and 
manipulate the electoral process.16 
The third key explanatory factor that is frequently highlighted is the diffusion of 
extra-state violence in Kenyan society, and it is often suggested that this facilitated 
the eruption, spread and intensity of the violence in 2007 – 08.17 Throughout the 
1990s, politicians mobilised violent ethnic militias to intimidate and displace 
opposition supporters – particularly in the Rift Valley – and it has now become 
commonplace for politicians across the country to employ armed youths as 
bodyguards and hired thugs during electoral campaigns.18 However, the fact that 
these groups have never been demobilised and persist outside of electoral periods 
facilitated their reactivation by politicians in 2007.19 Additionally, in response to 
  
rising insecurity and the limited capacity of the state to provide for or protect its 
citizens, ethnicised gangs have proliferated in urban areas and other parts of the 
countryside, acting as shadow states and vigilantes.20 In many ways, these groups 
have only further contributed to the increasing levels of generalised crime and 
violence in the country.21 By 2007, then, the state had clearly lost its monopoly on 
the use of force and the diffusion of extra-state violence, which meant that 
widespread chaos could be ‘ignited easily, but not controlled.’22 
Finally, many, if not most, analyses of ethnic violence in Kenya have drawn 
attention to the importance of significant ‘horizontal inequalities’23 in Kenyan 
society and grievances over historical marginalisation, discrimination, exclusion 
and domination – both real and perceived. In this context of deep-seated grievances 
violence is understood to ensue when ‘one feels compelled to act against the unjustly 
dominant groups as a way of changing the imbalance’,24 or out of a desire on the part 
of the dominant group to maintain its position of hegemony.25 Whilst grievances in 
Kenyan society revolve around a variety of socio-economic and political issues, the 
land question is frequently identified as the most significant issue that has repeatedly 
fuelled episodes of violence in the country. The re-Africanisation of land 
appropriated by European settlers followed ‘highly skewed and unequal patterns’26 
as certain communities were favoured over others. In particular, large tracts of land 
in the Rift Valley – to which the Kalenjin laid claim – were distributed to other 
communities in government settlement schemes. The sense of historical injustice 
over this pattern of land allocation provides significant fuel for politicians to stoke 
tensions and stir up conflict during elections. More than this, however, it has allowed 
leaders to use land as a patronage resource, and members of ethnic militias are often 
promised the land of their victims as a reward for their participation.27 As several 
scholars have noted, it is not insignificant that settlement schemes have been a major 
loci of violence in the Rift Valley.28 Thus, as Cheeseman surmises, ‘salient ethno- 
regional identities reinforced by historical grievances over land ownership, 
economic inequality and political exclusion, are central to an understanding of the 
Kenya crisis.’29 
In addition to highlighting these key drivers of conflict, analyses of the 2007 – 08 
post-election have also sought to disaggregate the various forms of violence that 
constituted the crisis. Three key – and largely overlapping – components of the 
postelection crisis have been identified: spontaneous, planned and state-driven.30 
The initial phase of violence was dominated by the spontaneous violence that 
exploded in response to the flawed elections and that assumed a clear ethnic 
dimension. Members of Kikuyu communities were attacked in ODM zones across 
the country, and in some places – most notably Nyanza and Western – these 
ethnicised attacks were also supplemented by the targeting of government 
institutions.31 This phase of violence was carried out by a range of actors including 
ordinary citizens, ad hoc criminal gangs, as well as armed groups attached to 
politicians.32 Planned and premeditated forms of violence have been identified as the 
second key component of the crisis, and most accounts note that this was most 
prominent in the Rift Valley region as Kalenjin militias were transported and funded 
  
to carry out attacks against Kikuyu residents. As the violence proceeded a more 
organised element emerged in other areas of the country as local politicians and 
business people paid youths to perpetuate the conflict and protect their properties, 
and larger groups such as the Mungiki, very likely with support from leading 
politicians, organised retaliatory attacks.33 The third form of violence highlighted in 
the literature is violence perpetrated by state agencies. Many accounts note that the 
police and other security agencies were responsible for a significant number of 
casualties and that their involvement was marked by ethnic partiality and an 
excessive use of force, even in the face of some of the initially more peaceful mass 
demonstrations that constituted some of the very early stages of the crisis. 34 Thus, 
there is a rich literature that highlights the complexity of violence and multiplicity of 
actors that perpetuated the conflict. 
These explanations go a long way in explaining how and why Kenya exploded in 
2007 – 08, and in understanding the various dynamics of violence that characterised 
the crisis across the country. However, there has been little disaggregation of urban 
violence, and existing accounts fall short of explaining the micro-level dynamics – 
and indeed, the dynamism – of the conflict in this arena. Spatial variations in 
violence participation cannot be easily explained through an analysis of elite 
motivations and structural factors alone; some further theoretical tools are needed. 
 
FRAMING AND THE KENYAN POSTELECTION VIOLENCE  
The dominant explanations of ethnic violence in Kenya are often not well equipped 
to account for micro-level variations in conflict dynamics. Frame analysis can help 
to address this gap. Since Snow et al.’s discussion of frame resonance,35 there has 
been a tendency for scholars to emphasise the calculated, strategic and intentional 
communication of frames by actors in pursuit of their goals.36 Undoubtedly, this can 
play into conflict dynamics. However, sole – or even primary – focus upon this 
dimension obscures the power of socially and culturally embedded  frames  to 
shape perception and behaviour on the ground, independent of elite manipulation, 
and it does not always explain differential resonance across time and space. Frames 
are socially constructed mental structures that shape the ways in which events are 
interpreted, perceived and responded to by local level actors;37 they are 
‘organizational premises’ that influence action and behaviour, and they must be 
sustained and maintained through everyday practices and activity. 38 That is to say, 
frames are produced and reproduced, and in some cases challenged and reconfigured 
through everyday life and experience. The relationship of frames to everyday 
practice means that they are mediated through by local contexts, and consequently 
are not wholly consistent and uniform across time and space. Indeed, certain frames 
can hold either more or less relevance to people’s everyday lives. This not only 
affects the success or failure of strategic framing efforts, but it also means that local 
level actors themselves perceive of and ‘frame’ events – and the most appropriate 
response to those events – in different ways. Localised framing processes 
undoubtedly influence conflict dynamics and should be examined in more depth. 
  
The subsequent discussion applies frame analysis to the Kenyan postelection 
violence, focusing primarily upon spontaneous, ethnicised forms of violence that 
arose in the urban context. It first identifies a host– guest dichotomy as the underlying 
frame of the conflict and situates this within everyday narratives of autochthony; it 
then demonstrates how the frame was amplified in the lead-up to the elections and 
how it shaped conflict dynamics, before concluding with a discussion of the frame’s 
flexibility. Throughout the analysis, I argue that frame analysis can render the urban 
socio-spatial variations of the Kenyan postelection violence more explicable. 
Autochthony and Everyday Ethnicity in Urban Kenya 
Myths of origin are a common feature of ethnic identification around the world, but 
they are particularly pronounced in the African context where the sense of spatial 
entitlement is reinforced by the historical relationship between ethnicity, territory 
and political boundaries. Whilst pre-colonial migration and settlement patterns laid 
some of the groundwork for attachments to space in Kenya, the colonial demarcation 
and administration of native reserves and the maintenance of these political 
boundaries in post-colonial politics has embedded territorialised identity narratives 
in Kenyan consciousness.39 Consequently, an insider/outsider dichotomy has 
emerged as the various provinces and regions have become universally understood 
as being the home of particular ethnic groups. Ethnic others living within these 
provinces are identified as ‘immigrants’ and ‘guests’ who can be subjected to a 
reduced citizenship status in times of political transition or uncertainty.40 As one 
interviewee states, ‘You’ve been welcomed [.. .] here. Keep in mind people, it will 
cost you to go to someone else’s land. I cannot just go to Kakamega. I’ll not claim 
that it is mine. It belongs to someone.’41  Recent scholarship has drawn attention    
to a resurgence of similar autochthonous discourses around the world, where self- 
proclaimed ‘sons of the soil’ query the citizenship status of ‘non-native’ 
communities and seek to impose significant constraints upon ‘migrants’ living in 
the area.42 In Kenya, these constraints are almost always related to issues of resource 
distribution and the control of the political and economic spheres. ‘Immigrant’ 
dominance of land, business, property, employment opportunities and other 
positions of economic privilege generates significant resentment amongst ‘host’ 
communities. As one interviewee explains, ‘Say like you are from Manchester and 
I am from Liverpool. I come to stay in Manchester, but I come there and I get 
privileges. How will you feel? [Or say] I’m from Eldoret, I was born there, but some 
Kikuyu has the land. How will it happen?’43 Intimately related to this issue of 
economic dominance is the belief that the native community should have more 
political say in their territory and that minority groups should not oppose the 
leanings of the host community.44 That is to say, minorities are expected to acquiesce 
to the political wishes of the majority: ‘When you go to Rome you do what Romans 
do . . .  if you are going to stay here you must do what the people here want.’45 Thus, 
autochthons expect to be favoured in the distribution of economic resources in their 
own areas, and resent any appearance of non-native dominance – or attempts at 
dominance – of the political arena. 
  
What is perhaps less frequently acknowledged, however, is that these 
autochthonous discourses are being reproduced in urban areas. In the informal 
settlements of Kenya’s cities, as neighbourhoods and villages come to be dominated 
by particular communities through rural-urban migration patterns, narratives of 
belonging and ownership emerge. As a Kamba youth living in Mathare slum 
explains: 
In this area the villages are along a tribal line. Some of the villages the 
majority are Kambas, like Viet there by Moi Air Base, and it borders the Luo 
area [.. .] Then there is a place belonging to Kikuyu, every tribe has their 
village.46 
Just as autochthons in rural areas expect to be favoured over ‘immigrants’, similar 
expectations of preference and superiority are apparent amongst majority 
communities in urban neighbourhoods. Perceptions of relative disadvantage vis-a`- 
vis other ethnic groups in the area can foster resentment and a sense of injustice. 
For example, a number of interviewees in Kibera point out that whilst the Luo 
constitute the majority, and the slum is understood by many to be ‘Luo territory,’47 
very few Luos own their houses. Instead, most are tenants of either Kikuyu or 
Nubian landlords and this is a significant source of tension. One resident stated, 
‘when they see that they are the majority here they think that they can rule. They are 
so many here but they don’t have houses here. The problem came from that side.’48 
Similarly, a Luo youth from Mathare expressed his discontent that members of his 
community were living in extremely poor conditions, despite the fact that they 
‘owned’ the space. He exclaims, ‘See how this house is? You’re in your own area, 
but you live like this and you’re in your own area?!’49 Moreover, just as 
‘immigrants’ are subject to political expectations and constraints at the regional 
level, urban minorities are also expected to vote with the host community: ‘If you 
don’t vote for our people, you can’t live here.’50 
The instability of autochthonous claims has been emphasised by a number of 
scholars both in the Kenyan case and across the African continent more generally. 
Claims of indigeneity and belonging are frequently challenged by those who arrived 
second,51 and ‘the idea of belonging “more” than others’ has become a common 
feature of autochthonous narratives.52 This is particularly true in the Kenyan case, 
where few communities can claim to be ‘deep-rooted sons of the soil’53 and where 
multiple and overlapping identity boundaries create additional dimensions of 
complexity in claims of belonging.54 Lonsdale has suggested that in this context, 
autochthonous claims can be based upon three idioms: understanding the land – 
which is the prerogative of first-comers; controlling the land – through pastoral 
expertise, for example; or working the land as farmers and making it more 
productive.55 Urban areas constitute an even more unstable arena for the politics of 
belonging to play out, and everyday practice becomes all the more important in 
producing, maintaining and challenging ‘imagined geographies.’56 Indeed, it is the 
dominance of territory that appears to be the strongest claim to ‘autochthony’ in 
urban contexts,57 and this is often asserted through a visible ethnicisation of space. 
  
The numerical superiority of particular communities and the construction of an 
insider/outsider framework becomes highly visible in everyday expressions of 
ethnic identity – both in the ‘banal’58 indicators that are ‘such a familiar part of the 
social environment that they operate mindlessly, rather than mindfully,’59 and in the 
more demonstrative performances of cultural identity. Banal expressions of 
ethnicity exist in abundance and are often so subtle that they pass by largely 
unnoticed. The visual and audible cues that Kenyans draw on to ascribe ethnic 
identity, for example – such as physical stature, accent, conversational style, 
behavioural characteristics – highlight ethnic predominance in an area and serve as 
an indicator of who belongs and who does not. Similarly, signposts advertising 
vernacular church services, or billboards advertising the sale of ethnic dishes 
reaffirm the sense of ethnic ownership, and the more demonstrative performances of 
identity that occur during life-cycle events – such as weddings, funerals, and other 
cultural celebrations – further contribute to the ethnicisation of urban space. 
Perhaps, the clearest indicator of ethnic predominance is the use of language. It is 
not uncommon to hear vernacular languages spoken in ethnicised urban settings.  
In 4B, Mathare, two interviewees were unable to converse in Sheng (a slang 
language of the youth), Kiswahili or English, and we had to carry out the interview 
in their mother tongue, suggesting that the Jaluo language is used extensively in the 
area. Even when Sheng is the principal language of communication, it is commonly 
inflected  with  vocabulary  from  the  dominant  community’s  mother  tongue.   
As Mazrui notes, ‘There are local variations of the language which betray the 
presence of ethnically predominant groups in the respective localities.’60 Thus, 
through these banal and demonstrative acts, urban spaces become visibly ethnicised, 
and as one interviewee states, there is a sense that ‘all you need to do is go around in 
their neighbourhoods and you can see the difference.’61 
The spatial concentration of ethnic communities should not be understood as   
‘a residential agglomeration of social groups in neutral and static space’;62 rather, 
these everyday expressions of ethnic identity act as a symbolic appropriation of 
space, and serve to construct insider/outsider, host/guest dichotomies. Indeed, 
numerical supremacy is conflated with narratives of ownership and belonging, and in 
some cases the name of a neighbourhood is even altered by residents to reflect this. 
For example, in Eldoret and Nairobi Luo-dominated villages have been renamed 
Kisumu Ndogo, meaning ‘Little Kisumu’ – Kisumu being the capital of the Luo 
province of Nyanza.63 Thus, in urban areas, the underlying frame of autochthony is 
produced and maintained through the continual ‘flagging’64 of ethnic predominance 
and the everyday signs of spatial ethnicisation. 
In contrast, however, there are a few non-ethnicised territories within Kenya’s 
urban slums, where there is no clear majority community. Banal indicators of 
identity reflect the more ethnically mixed demography of the area and more 
demonstrative performances of ethnicity are infrequent within these spaces. Thus, 
lived experience fails to generate the sense of ethnicised belonging, entitlement and 
exclusion found elsewhere. A resident of Nigeria, Mathare, for example asserts, 
‘All the communities live here, no community dominates. In those other places 
  
down there, either the Kikuyu or the Luo dominate but here every tribe lives here.’65 
Similarly, in Kenya Service, a village on the outskirts of Eldoret, residents 
emphasised the cosmopolitan nature of the area. As one interviewee states, ‘All the 
tribes are here [.. .] But there [in the neighbouring villages] everyone is in his 
place.’66 Thus, the underlying frame of autochthony is absent from these urban 
neighbourhoods. No community is recognised as having a greater right to the 
economic resources of the area nor are residents expected to vote in a particular way. 
The autochthonous frame is challenged by everyday practices of interaction and 
inclusion. 
Recognising these everyday constructions of ethnically inclusive or exclusive 
urban spaces is crucial to understanding the socio-spatial patterns of the 2007 – 08 
postelection violence. It is this frame of autochthony that was amplified during the 
election period and which underscored the conflict. Consequently, where everyday 
practices of identity challenge the notion of ethno-spatial belonging, the frame failed 
to resonate and flourish. 
Punishing ‘bad’ guests in the 2007 elections 
In the lead-up to the 2007 elections, and throughout the course of the violence, the 
autochthony frame was amplified both strategically by political elites and more 
organically at the local level. Notions of spatial ownership and entitlement were 
vocalised and actively performed during the campaigns as minorities were reminded 
– sometimes violently – of their secondary citizenship status, particularly in regard 
to political behaviour. Furthermore, much of the conflict itself was shaped by the 
desire to punish and evict ‘bad’ guests who had betrayed the majority community in 
the elections rather than by any attempt to exterminate or kill off one ethnic group.67 
However, as Benford and Snow note, this process of frame amplification involves 
invigorating and highlighting already existing interpretative frames,68 and so, whilst 
the host/guest discourse came to the fore in ethnicised settings, it could not flourish 
or resonate in non-ethnicised spaces where autochthony is not embedded in lived 
experience. Thus, whilst ethnic spaces were marked by substantial tension and 
conflict during the campaigns and descended into acute violence immediately after 
the presidential announcement, non-ethnicised territories remained calm throughout 
the crisis. 
During the campaigns, in addition to propagating derogatory and hateful language 
about other communities, political elites also played upon territorialised identity 
narratives and expectations of spatial politico-economic dominance in an effort to 
mobilise their followers and intimidate opposition supporters. This was particularly 
pronounced at the macro-regional level, where politicians were able to tap into these 
narratives through the discourse of majimbo (devolution). This federalist system of 
government became a key platform of the ODM campaign, offering communities the 
potential for greater power and inclusion in the political and economic spheres and an 
assurance of protection against marginalisation. However, majimbo also resonated 
as a more sinister proposal for the homogenisation of ancestral homelands and    
the ‘repatriation’ of ‘foreigners’, playing directly into local desires for exclusive 
  
political, economic and social control of their own territories. Indeed, ODM 
politicians were deliberately vague in their elucidation of majimbo in order to 
facilitate the spread of this more negative interpretation.69 In addition to this more 
passive means of amplifying the host/guest frame, a number of national and local 
level politicians made more direct reference to notions of removing ‘foreigners’ from 
native territory. In the Rift Valley, for instance, the phrase ‘kuondoa madoadoa’ – 
‘remove the stains or dots’ – was used regularly during the campaign period, and 
several interviewees reported that elites promised to return the land to its ‘rightful 
owners’ upon their election. Thus, political elites amplified the frame of autochthony 
by highlighting the non-native status of ethnic others, by invigorating notions of 
rightful ownership of land and other economic resources, and by fostering the 
negative interpretation of the majimbo rhetoric. Local-level politicians also 
accentuated notions of territorial ownership in urban spaces and fears of minority 
domination. In Mathare, for example, ODM politicians reportedly played upon 
resentments over Kikuyu dominance in the area, stating, ‘You people are like 
underdogs living on less than a dollar a day. Why is everything here for the 
Kikuyus?’70 
Whilst these top-down efforts to accentuate autochthonous discourses certainly 
resonated in ethnicised settings, local, bottom-up amplification processes were far 
more pervasive and indeed explicit, in invigorating the good guest/bad guest frame. 
The borders between ethnic territories became increasingly reified in the lead-up to 
the elections as residents made the political preference of the area apparent. 
Ethnicised neighbourhoods became ‘no-go zones’71 for any form of alternative 
politics. The campaign posters of the majority community’s party were pasted 
around the territory, and indeed were the only campaign materials permitted in the 
area. Campaigners caught trying to erect posters for the ‘wrong’ party were often 
attacked and chased from the area. Similarly, anyone passing through the village 
wearing the t-shirt of an unacceptable party would be abused or beaten – and, on 
occasion, even killed – as residents policed the politics of the space. Candidates 
from other parties were violently prevented from entering ethnic enclaves, and any 
opposition rallies that did penetrate the borders were soon disrupted by youths of the 
area. In some places, residents even scrawled the letters ODM or PNU on the 
structures of the slum and on the roadways visibly politicising the territory and 
asserting the rules of hospitality to which ‘guests’ were expected to abide. One 
interviewee explained that during the campaigns ‘you must respect the borders’72 
and another surmises: 
This area is an ODM zone. If you come here and you shout “PNU!” you are 
calling for death for yourself and if you go there to PNU areas and shout 
“ODM!” you’ll be in shit. You have to go with the chorus of the area, if it is 
ODM and you’re PNU, you just follow the chorus.73 
In this suffocating political environment, expectations of conformity were clear and 
facilitated the casting of ethnic others as either good or bad guests. Those who were 
thought to be opposing the majority community’s wishes were framed as ‘bad’ 
  
guests who needed to be reminded of their secondary citizenship status; they were 
intimidated and threatened throughout the campaign period, and were explicitly 
warned that if they were to vote against the wishes of the host community, they 
would no longer be welcome to stay in the area: ‘if you don’t vote for us, you must 
leave our area.’74 One Kikuyu interviewee’s recollection of an incident during the 
campaign period is particularly revealing of the accentuated articulation of the guest 
frame. As an electrician from Huruma in Eldoret, he had travelled to a neighbouring 
Kalenjin village for work. Having completed the job, his client refused to pay him, 
telling him: 
“My friend, if you come to me and you see me eating meat, then you must also 
eat meat [.. .] You don’t eat greens, because I am eating meat.” [.. .] He was 
telling me that you must do what you get me doing. It was because I am not 
one of them, so the meaning is that here in Eldoret we are like visitors and we 
must do what the owners do. If it is to vote for Ruto, then we must vote for 
Ruto and not to vote for someone else. That is what he was telling me. That 
man didn’t pay me.75 
Notice here that not only are the political expectations of conformity clearly 
vocalised, but control of the economic realm is also alluded to, as the Kalenjin client 
refuses to pay a ‘bad’ guest who is not respecting the rules of hospitality. 
By contrast, however, those perceived to be, or visibly seen to be, supporting the 
right party were framed as ‘good’ guests who were welcome to engage in politics in 
the area.76 Consequently, on the ODM side, entire communities – such as the 
Luhya, the Kalenjin, the Luo, and the Kamba – were cast as ‘good’ guests in ODM 
zones, as they were perceived to be part of the ODM alliance. More revealingly, 
however, is the fact that Kikuyu candidates running on ODM tickets in ODM areas 
enjoyed significant support in ODM-affiliated enclaves, as they were seen to be 
operating within the parameters of acceptability. In Kawangware, a Kikuyu youth 
known as KJ mobilised significant support in the Luo and Luhya dominated 
territories of 56 and Satellite, and similarly a Kikuyu civic candidate was able to 
run his campaign in Kibera without threat or intimidation. Similarly, ordinary 
residents who were seen to be active supporters of the ‘right’ party were also privy 
to good guest status. A Luo youth who worked in Kikuyu-dominated Shabab, 
Nakuru, for example, explained that ‘the Kikuyu are the majority here, so I was on 
the PNU side’77 and he was well accepted in the area. Similarly, in Gatuikera, 
Kibera a Kikuyu youth escaped the intimidation and threats other residents reported 
being subjected to because he was an active supporter of ODM. Indeed, some 
residents made a conscious effort to be vocal in their support of a particular party in 
order to demonstrate clearly their acquiescence to the rules of hospitality – even if, 
at times, this conformity was largely pretence. In Kibera, for example, one Kikuyu 
youth explained that he was attacked on two occasions for his heavy involvement 
with the PNU campaign. He subsequently pretended to switch his support to ODM 
in order to prevent attacks and  to be seen as  an acceptable political presence in  
the area: 
  
The second time I was attacked it was during night hours. [.. .] We changed 
our PNU t-shirts for ODM ..  .[They said] ‘Hey I know you, I thought you were 
for PNU?’ I said, ‘No, brother, we are ODM now,’ so I called this guy [he 
points to his friend ] and I tell him, ‘We must do something. There is a rally 
tomorrow for Raila. We must join with those guys so that they can see we are 
for ODM.’ They are then saying ‘Ah, he is with us for ODM now’ and I say, 
‘Yes, I have changed.’78 
Thus, members of minority communities who adhered to the political rules of 
hospitality – or who at least appeared to do so – were largely accepted in the area 
and cast as good guests. 
Following the announcement of the presidential results and the outbreak of 
violence, the good guest/bad guest frame further defined the nature of the violence in 
urban areas. Rather than being an effort to kill off a particular community, the 
violence was framed by an attempt to punish and evict bad guests. As one 
interviewee recalls, his attackers told him: ‘This is an ODM zone and you chose 
PNU so you must suffer the consequences.’79 Minorities who were perceived to have 
voted against the wishes of the host community were chased away from the area, 
their houses were burned and their businesses razed to the ground to prevent them 
from returning to the area. The tendency to either burn or, in some places to 
appropriate, minority’s businesses further illustrates the underlying frame of 
autochthony, majority communities sought to reclaim control of the economic 
sphere within their territories by removing the minority’s means of extraction.     
As one interviewee concedes, ‘We thought, let us beat up Kikuyu for them to run 
away to leave for us their businesses.’80 
Important to note, however, is that, at least in the initial phases of violence, 
members of minority communities who had been seen to be supporting the right 
party during the campaigns were not targeted. For example, a Luo youth recalled 
that in Kaptembwa, Nakuru, ‘the residents of the area used to say, “Don’t break so 
and so, he was ODM.”’81 Similarly, residents of Ronda, Nakuru, intervened in an 
attack upon a Kamba resident by Kalenjin warriors from outside the area, 
exclaiming, ‘No, no, don’t hurt him. He’s a strong ODM supporter, he campaigned 
with us as a driver.’82 Thus, members of minority communities who were identified 
as good guests, as having respected the political wishes of the community were not 
targeted in the early stages of the violence, and, in some cases, were even protected 
from attack by others. As the violence progressed, however, even these individuals 
tended to flee as violence itself came to shift the criteria for good guest status. This 
dynamic element of conflict is discussed in more depth in the subsequent section. 
In contrast, non-ethnicised territories remained relatively calm throughout the 
campaign period and did not descend into violence following the announcement of 
the presidential results. The good guest/bad guest frame had little resonance in these 
spaces, so any rhetoric employed by elites fell on deaf ears, and the frame could not 
flourish through more locally initiated practices. Indeed, whilst political debate was 
stifled in ethnicised spaces, and the expectation of political conformity was visibly 
  
and violently enacted, ethnically mixed spaces enjoyed far greater freedom of 
political expression. Campaign rallies from both parties were able to operate in these 
areas since there was no sense of political entitlement in the space. As one 
interviewee from Nigeria, Mathare, states, ‘There were ODM and PNU supporters, 
the rallies were held here, but there was no hatred. You have a right to campaign here 
or to campaign anywhere.’83 He later notes that, in contrast to ethnicised settings, 
‘here we’re neutral, you can just vote for who you want. No group would come and 
force you to vote for them.’84 Certainly, there were arguments and disputes in these 
areas as people voting for different parties expressed their opinions, but, in the 
absence of a dominant community with claims of ownership over the territory, the 
expectation of political conformity was neither present nor policed. Following the 
announcement of the presidential results, these spaces resisted degeneration into 
violence, despite the conflict raging in neighbouring villages. Indeed, in the absence 
of a host– guest dichotomy, residents in these spaces tended to unite to protect their 
neighbourhoods. As one interviewee in Kenya Service recalls: ‘Here our elders in 
this community called everyone and told us, “You are not a Luo, or a Nandi, or a 
Kikuyu anymore. We are Kenyans. We must come together to take care of our 
community.”’85 Similarly, Nigeria in Mathare did not erupt into violence and was 
not targeted by the groups fighting in the neighbouring villages. As one Kikuyu 
woman stated: 
Outside this area war was taking place but here things were cool [.. .] In this 
area it is mixed with all tribes, but in Number 10 and Bondeni the majority are 
one tribe and the minority are the Kikuyu so they were chased. But here there 
is no majority and no minority.86 
Thus, in non-ethnicised settings, no one community lays claim to the space. The 
host– guest frame is absent from everyday life, and consequently could not be 
amplified by either political elites or local level actors. As a result, these territories 
were marked more by cooperation than by conflict, they did not erupt into violent 
ethnic conflict following the elections, and they were seldom targeted by outside 
groups. 
 
Casting ‘good’ and ‘bad’ guests: the flexibility of the autochthony frame 
The previous section has demonstrated that the autochthony frame shaped both the 
micro-geographies of the crisis and the nature of violence. In addition to this 
influence, the inherent flexibility of the frame ensured its amenability to local 
contexts, to the shifting fault lines of conflict and to the dynamism of violence. 
Indeed, the classification of good guests and bad guests was not consistent across 
either time or space. Communities who were bitterly fighting in one area were 
elsewhere united against a common enemy, and, as the violence continued, 
previously acceptable communities could be transformed into unwelcome occupiers 
as the criteria for good guest status changed. 
  
In the lead-up to the 2007 elections, the 41-against-1 narrative came to dominate 
the political scene. Consequently, throughout the campaigns, the Kikuyu were cast 
in the role of ‘bad’ guests in ODM zones, whilst ODM-affiliated communities living 
in Kikuyu areas were similarly threatened and intimidated. As such, the framing of 
who constituted a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ guest was relatively static and uniform across 
ethnicised spaces. However, the fault lines of the conflict were far less consistent 
once violence erupted, and there were significant localised reclassifications of good 
and bad guests. Local demographics, for example, were often crucial to the 
formulation of good guest/bad guest statuses, and in places where there was a greater 
threat from external attack by a third community, residents tended to unite to protect 
their village. In the Kikuyu-dominated centres of Huruma and Munyaka in Eldoret, 
for example, the tensions throughout the campaigns reflected the macro-political 
divide, and it was clear to residents that ‘this area is for PNU supporters.’87 However, 
once the violence had erupted, large groups of Kalenjin warriors launched attacks on 
the villages and residents from across the ethno-political divide – from the Luo, 
Luhya and Kikuyu communities – recognised the need to unite against a common 
Kalenjin aggressor. As one interviewee states, ‘at the time of problem you must fight 
those coming to attack so they [the youth of the area] put politics aside.’88 Thus, 
localised contexts required subtle reformulations of the  41-against-1  narrative, 
and the flexibility of the good guest/bad guest frame facilitated these localised 
negotiations. 
In addition to these spatially contingent constructions of ethnic others, there were 
also significant temporal shifts in the criteria for good guest/bad guest status. As the 
violence continued, individuals, and in some cases entire communities, who had 
initially been regarded as accepted guests found themselves recast as unwelcome 
occupiers. For example, in the ODM neighbourhoods of Mathare, members of the 
Kamba community were not initial targets of attack. The party of Kamba politician 
Kalonzo Musyoka, ODM-Kenya, did not present any significant challenge to Raila’s 
campaign, and the other leading Kamba politician, Charity Ngilu, was a key figure 
in the ODM alliance. Consequently, the Kamba were cast as acceptable guests. 
However, on 8 January 2008, with the country engulfed in chaos and the political 
dispute remaining unresolved, Musyoka accepted the position of Vice President in 
Kibaki’s administration. He was immediately labelled as a traitor by ODM-affiliated 
communities and members of his Kamba community were recast as bad guests  
who were no longer welcome to live in ODM zones. As one interviewee noted, 
‘The Kamba, they were beaten by the Luos because Kalonzo joined Kibaki so the 
Luos were furious.’89 He goes on to emphasise the mentality underpinning these 
shifts: ‘If they couldn’t support us, then they were our enemies. They had to side with 
us.’90 Thus, any sign that a community was acting against the host group could 
engender a change in their status. In a similar way, the violence itself served to alter 
relations at the local level. As has been highlighted above, members of minority 
communities who had been active supporters of the ‘right’ party during the campaigns 
were initially protected by local residents. However, as the violence progressed, 
tensions began to emerge as residents questioned the acceptability of communities 
  
who were attacking their ethnic kin in other parts of the country. As one interviewee 
exclaims, ‘my people were killed in your area so why should I stay with you here?’91 
Local level incidents could provoke similar transformations of good guest/bad 
guest statuses. A particularly prominent example was related by a number  of 
interviewees in Langas, Eldoret. Here, residents suggested that the Kisii were 
initially on the side of the ODM-affiliated communities in the area stating that after 
the announcement they joined in with attacks against the Kikuyu. However, when a 
Kalenjin MP, David Too, was killed by a Kisii policeman, ‘it affected the estate, so it 
brought a problem to the Kisii. The Nandi’s were saying, “You have to move.”’92 
Again, the host– guest frame shaped the violence, and as communities were seen to 
cross new lines of acceptability during the violence itself, they were recast as bad 
and unwelcome guests who needed to be evicted from the area. Indeed, this is the 
inherent danger of the host– guest narrative: hosts get to decide on the rules of the 
visit,93 and these rules can change very quickly. 
In sum, conflict is marked by dynamism and variation. An analysis of localised 
framing processes can help explain the ways in which localised complexities are 
negotiated and integrated into broader conflict dynamics. The most successful 
frames – those that will resonate and flourish across a wide range of settings – are 
those that are flexible  enough  to  be  reconfigured  to  suit  local  circumstances. 
In Kenya, autochthonous discourses serve to cast all minority communities as guests 
who are subject to certain rules of hospitality. However, the rules of hospitality are 
determined at the local level and they can shift significantly over time and space, 
transforming acceptable communities into bad guests who are no longer welcome to 
stay in the area. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Existing analyses of the Kenyan crisis offer valuable explanations of the violence 
and provide important insights into the structural roots of conflict. However, they 
often fail to capture the micro-level socio-spatial variations in conflict dynamics, 
especially in the urban arena. Frame analysis can help to fill this gap in our 
understanding. This paper has argued that the frame of autochthony underscored the 
spontaneous, ethnicised forms of urban violence in the 2007 – 08 postelection 
violence in Kenya and can help to explain how isolated pockets of peace persisted in 
the informal slums of Kenya’s cities. In ethnicised neighbourhoods, the autochthony 
frame is produced and maintained through banal and demonstrative performances of 
identity within space. In the lead-up to the 2007 elections, this frame was amplified 
both by political elites and by local level actors, as the host– guest dichotomy was 
highlighted and expectations of political conformity were visibly articulated. Those 
perceived to be compliant to the demands of the host community were cast as good 
guests, whilst others were branded as ‘bad’ guests. After the announcement of the 
presidential results, violence erupted in ethnicised spaces across the country and 
communities sought to punish and evict guests who had abused the rules of 
hospitality. However, in non-ethnicised territories, the autochthonous frame is 
  
absent from everyday life and no host– guest dichotomy exists. Consequently, 
amplification processes failed to resonate or flourish in these areas, and they resisted 
degeneration into violence. Finally, the classification of good and bad guests was 
neither spatially nor temporally consistent, but rather was subject to localised 
framing processes. Thus, the application of framing to the analysis of the Kenyan 
crisis draws attention to local level agency during conflict, accounts for variations in 
violence dynamics across time and space and elucidates the localised processes of 
violence. 
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